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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 
There is a need for better cost estimating and forecasting for highway work in the 
Commonwealth of Kentucky. The objective of this study, approved July 1993, was to 
investigate current practices and to recommend improvements for the estimating process. 
This report details the findings of five years of research effort. 
The Kentucky Transportation Cabinet (KyTC) is responsible for the creation of a six-year 
highway construction plan listing proposed projects which reflects the highway needs of the 
state. The General Assembly approves those projects that will be funded in the coming 
biennium. Reasonable cost forecasts for new and ongoing projects are required to ensure that 
funding is available and projects can be advanced on an orderly schedule. 
KRS45.245, effective 1 July, 1992, granted the Interim Joint Committee on Transportation 
(IJCT) oversight of the biennial highway plan. Any phase of an authorized highway project--
design, right-of-way, utility relocation, or construction--that exceeds the estimate shown in 
the plan by 15% must be reviewed by the IJCT. Estimates developed using current methods 
did not prove to be sufficiently accurate to preclude cost overruns in excess of 15%. During 
the reporting period (7/1192 - 6/30/98), 562 overruns totaling approximately $265 million 
were submitted to the IJCT--all were approved for additional funding. No concerted effort 
was made by the IJCT to track the number of cost underruns. This review requirement was 
canceled by the General Assembly (HB 655) during the 1998 legislative session. 
Estimates for highway projects are usually the responsibility of the 12 Highway District 
Offices, which have few resources allotted to estimating. Furthermore, initial estimates, 
based on very little information, do not statistically support a± 15% confidence level. In light 
of the high variability of estimates based on little information and the lack of resources 
dedicated to estimating, a reasonable approach is to base estimates on actual costs of past 
projects. For the conceptual estimate, the one used for initial authorization of a project, a 
cost-per-mile figure based on similar past projects can be used. After the design is completed 
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on a new project, estimates for the remaining phases--right-of-way, utility relocation, and 
construction--can be updated to reflect design decisions such as route, grade and drain, etc. 
A cost-per-mile estimating model, KYEstimate, was developed to assist estimators in making 
conceptual estimates using databases of preconstruction (design, right-of-way acquisition, 
and utility relocation) and construction project costs for the past six years. 
This study collected data for cost overruns, developed construction and preconstruction 
databases, established a standard for the storage of data in the databases, and developed a 
user-friendly computer program, KYEstimate, to assist estimators to use historic data to make 
and/or justify estimates. Training on the program was provided to estimators on request. 
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INTRODUCTION 
There is a need for better cost estimating and forecasting for highway work in the 
Commonwealth of Kentucky. This need was recognized by the Kentucky Transportation 
Cabinet (KyTC), the Kentucky Legislature and the Federal Highway Administration 
(FHW A). A three-year research project was approved by the KyTC and the FHW A, starting 
in July 1993, to study current practices and to recommend improvements for the estimating 
process. The project timetable specified the following annual goals: 
• Year 1 (7/93-6/94) - Study current practices and problems, and make preliminary 
recommendations for potential improvement areas. 
• Year 2 (7/94-6/95) - Develop and/or modify procedures and tools to 1mprove the 
estimating process. 
• Year 3 (7/95-6/96)- Implement improvements and train KyTC personnel in their use. 
In 1996 the study was extended for two years, with the following goals: 
• Year 4 (7/96-6/97) - Collect additional cost data, refine KYEstimate and train KyTC 
personnel in its use. 
• Year 5 (7/97 -6/98) - Collect additional cost data. 
The impetus for improving cost forecasting for highway work came from a law enacted 
during the 1992 General Assembly session. KRS 45.245, effective July 1, 1992, mandated 
that the amount authorized for expenditure on any project phase--design, right-of-way, utility 
relocation or construction--cannot exceed that stated in the current biennium highway plan 
(2YP) by more than 15% without being presented by the KyTC to the Legislature's Interim 
Joint Committee on Transportation (IJCT) for review. The presentation to the IJCT included 
written certification from the State Highway Engineer that the overrun was caused by 
unanticipated circumstances, and provided specific details on the reasons for the cost 
overrun. The IJCT determined if the proposed additional money was reasonable and 
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necessary, and also, if any alteration made or planned since its consideration by the General 
Assembly materially changed the project. The law was cancelled by HB655 during the 1998 
General Assembly and there is no longer a requirement for formal review by the IJCT of cost 
overruns. During the law's six year life, 562 phase overruns > 15%, for a total cost of 
approximately $260 million, were submitted to the IJCT and all were approved for additional 
funding. 
This, the final report, discusses the findings of the five years of the project: 
• Summary of First Year's Findings - reviews the research findings presented in the first 
interim report, KTC 94-9, March 1994. 
• Summary of Second Year's Findings - reviews the research findings presented in the 
second interim report, KTC 95-12, July 1995. 
• Summary of Third Year's Findings - reviews the research findings presented in the third 
interim report, KTC 96-14, July 1996. 
• Summary of Fourth & Fifth Year's Findings - reviews the efforts presented in the fourth 
interim report, KTC 97-13, July 1996, and those of the fifth year. 
• Estimates During the Period of Study - presents an analysis of the cost overruns > 15% 
that were presented to the IJCT for review during the research period. 
• Cost-per-mile Model - presents a computer model, KYEstimate, that sorts data from the 
preconstruction and construction databases to assist an estimator in making a conceptual 
estimate based on past performance. 
• Conclusions - reports conclusions based on research findings. 
• Recommendations - makes recommendations based on the research effort. 
• Appendix I- contains explanations for codes used by KYEstimate. 
• Appendix I! -contains breakdown of cost overruns > 15% by causes. 
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SUMMARY OF FIRST YEAR'S FINDINGS 
The section provides a summary of the status of the research effort when the first interim 
report, KTC 94-9, was issued in March 1994. The statements used reflect conditions at that 
time and may be updated later in this report to reflect current conditions. 
The current process of forecasting costs for highway work in Kentucky is not satisfactory to 
either the KyTC or the Legislature. The reporting requirements of the new oversight law, 
KRS45.245, impose additional burdens on an already seriously understaffed highway 
department. The limits imposed for reporting are in some cases difficult to meet, and in other 
cases possible to meet only with additional staffing and/or by not performing current duties. 
The choice seems to be to either accept the status quo or to try to mitigate the problem; 
Solving the problem entirely--insuring that no project phase overruns its estimate by 15%--is 
not reasonable. There are three ways to address the issue of cost estimate deficiencies and 
subsequent justification furnished to the Legislature. The first is for the Legislature to either 
forego the oversight or to modifY it so the KyTC can meet the requirements with current 
staffing levels. The second is for the KyTC to change how the 6YP and the 2YP are 
developed, and the third is for the KyTC to staff up as necessary to improve its estimating 
ability. All of these options have financial and political implications. 
The current oversight requirement had resulted, to date, in 134 overruns worth over $69 
million being presented to the IJCT for review. All of these overruns were approved. The 
IJCT makes no concerted effort to track cost underruns, which would provide as much 
evidence as cost overruns to verifY the accuracy of project estimates. In an effort to address 
this problem KyTC is increasing estimates to reduce the possibility of having to report phase 
overruns in the future. This practice makes the development of a realistic 6YP and 2YP 
unlikely. 
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The Legislature could either forego the oversight or modifY it so the KyTC can meet the 
requirements with current staffing levels. A statute change would be required to forego the 
oversight or to change its provisions. Modifications that could mitigate the current problem 
include setting a realistic limit for both overruns and underruns based on the class of estimate 
in the 2YP, not 15% across the board; track overruns by overall project cost instead of by 
project phase; and/or establish a review process that requires the KyTC to inform the IJCT by 
report of all overruns and underruns, but to formally respond with backup data to only those 
overruns the IJCT truly thinks may need to be examined, not those that will be summarily 
approved. 
The KyTC can change how the 6YP and the 2YP are developed. The most effective change 
would be to complete either an in-depth scoping study and/or preliminary design prior to 
adding a project to the 6YP. This would require that work performed prior to authorization of 
the 6YP be funded by state funds. 
The KyTC can staff up to improve its estimating ability. Increased staffing would require 
either the Executive Branch's approval for hiring additional personnel and/or KyTC's 
commitment to reallocate resources. The increased staffing would primarily include right-of-
way and utility personnel to be involved in preliminary estimating. Also, demands for on-the-
spot estimates would have to be curtailed so the increased staff could scope the proposed 
project prior to submitting the initial estimate. 
The three ways to mitigate the current problem are being used, to some degree, by other states. 
The largest notable difference between Kentucky and most other states is the legislative 
oversight requirement. While many states have some sort of progress review of the highway 
plan, almost none have legislative involvement after budget approval. Many states are better 
staffed for estimating than Kentucky and some states do a considerable amount of preliminary 
design work prior to a project being placed on the highway plan. 
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Regardless of which of the above-mentioned options, or combinations thereof, are selected to 
mitigate the current problem, improvement of the current estimating and cost forecasting 
process is possible. Areas this study will address during the next year are: how to better use 
existing data, what unused data sources are available, and how to improve current estimating 
procedures. 
Estimates are a product of experience and information. Estimating experience has been 
disappearing rapidly in the KyTC. It is vitally important to develop databases and make them 
available to personnel throughout the state. These databases will not only improve estimating 
ability but will serve to help justifY estimates that later turn out to be inaccurate. 
This study offers an opportunity to make improvements to the KyTC's cost forecasting ability 
and to the relationship between the KyTC and the Legislature. In order to seize this 
opportunity, both the Legislature and the KyTC must communicate openly with each other, 
and with the researcher, in an effort to find a workable solution which considers both political 
and fiscal realities. 
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SUMMARY OF SECOND YEAR'S FINDINGS 
The second interim report, KTC 95-12, issued in July 1995, is summarized in this section. 
Statements used in this section of the report reflect conditions at that particular time, and may 
be changed later to represent current conditions. 
Research continues to show that the Legislature should either forego the oversight or modifY it 
so the KyTC can meet requirements with the current staffing levels, the KyTC must change 
how the 6YP and the 2YP are developed, and/or the KyTC should increase its staff to improve 
the estimates. 
The current oversight requirement had resulted, to date, in 263 overruns worth over $116 
million being presented to the IJCT since the law became effective (7/1192). All of these 
overruns were approved. The IJCT continued to make no concerted effort to track cost 
underruns. 
Relevant cost data for both preconstruction and construction phases were collected to provide 
estimators with cost from past projects. These projects are stored in a manner that allows 
estimators to efficientlyselect data useful to their current project. 
Projects in both databases are defined by twelve key attributes: 
1 District 
2 Item# 
3 County 
4 Type of work 
5 Functional classification 
6 Number of lanes 
7 Length 
8 Percent bridge length 
9 Number of bridges or major culverts 
10 Award year 
11 Route name 
12 TD-10 Number 
District - state highway district or districts; by number 1 - 12 
Item # - district identifier number 
County - county or counties; by name 
Type of work- FHWA Order M5600.1A, 12/87 (see Appendix I) 
·Functional classifications- KyTC classification system (see Appendix I) 
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Number of lanes- number of lanes involved 
Length - length in miles to three decimal points 
Percent bridge length - [bridge length/project length] x I 00 
Number of bridges- total number of bridges (or culverts> $50,000) in project 
Award year - calendar year project was awarded for construction 
Route Name- number of road: US60, KY109, etc. 
TD-10 Number- number on the Project Authorization Form 
Along with the above attributes are the cost of each preconstruction phase or construction 
phase and the fiscal year of the project. The search for data was limited to the last four years 
because of missing data related to the twelve attributes. Key characteristics were missing 
from many of the projects, precluding their inclusion in the databases. 
The cost per mile model, KYEstimate, is written in Microsoft EXCEL 5.0 and designed to aid 
in the estimating process. The program will allow estimators to access the databases and 
select past projects that are similar to a project they want to estimate. The program uses the 
length of the project and total costs to calculate the unit costs of the project. The estimators 
can then use the historical data or enter their own estimate based upon their past experience. 
A stunmary sheet of all pertinent information about the estimate can be printed and/or saved 
for later reference. The model is still under development. 
A model was also under development using a cost per parcel concept for the right-of-way 
phase. This program was also developed in Microsoft EXCEL 5.0. The database was defined 
by attributes such as: parcel number, owner's name, parcel type, cost of parcel, area of parcel, 
building purchase, and litigation. The model and data seemed to be insufficient for 
determining an accurate cost per parcel. There was an extremely high variation in values for 
similar projects, and as a result, this method for developing a conceptual estimate for the 
right-of-way phase was abandoned. 
A questionnaire was sent to the twelve district highway offices asking about the current 
process for developing conceptual estimates, seventy percent were returned. Responses 
showed that although most estimators are comfortable with their conceptual estimates, they 
are nol sure what constitutes a good conceptual estimate because of lack of feedback. 
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Performance measurements that were being investigated included: 
Actual cost of project phases vs. Estimated cost of project phases 
Number of projects let vs. Number of projects planned to let · 
Actual Revenues vs. Estimated Revenues 
Number of projects negotiated vs. Number of projects litigated 
Amount of money received form federal turnovers at end of the federal GY 
Standard Deviation of [[A - E]/ A]* 1 00 for each year 
Number of project overruns 
Number of project underruns 
The current process for forecasting costs for highway work in Kentucky is not satisfactory to 
either the KyTC or the Legislature. The overrun threshold, > 15%, is arbitrary and causes 
much wasted effort by KyTC personnel. It would be more effective to use different thresholds 
for different phases. Another alternative would be to update estimates once the design phase 
is completed and a better scope of work is determined. An improvement to the current 
process would be to require that only overruns beyond a certain amount be formally presented 
to the IJCT and others require only a proper notification. 
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SUMMARY OF THIRD YEAR'S FINDINGS 
This section provides a summary of the third year's annual report, KTC 96-14, issued in July 
!996. The information stated is a reflection of conditions at the time of issue and may be 
updated later in this report to indicate current conditions. 
Research continues to show that some changes must be enacted to reduce the amount and cost 
of overruns. Three possible solutions include: First, the Legislature should either forego the 
oversight or modify it so the KyTC can meet requirements with the current staffing levels. 
Second, the KyTC should change how the 6YP and the 2YP are developed. Third, the KyTC 
should increase its staff to improve the estimates. 
The current oversight requirement had resulted, to date, in 362 overruns worth over $162 
million being presented to the IJCT. All of these overruns have been approved for additional 
funding. No concerted effort was made by the IJCT to track cost underruns. 
The cost-per-mile model, KYEstimate, was refined to incorporate an inflation factor and the 
ability to convert the database to metric units. This inflation factor enables KYEstimate to 
provide a more realistic prediction of project cost. The conversion of units from English to 
metric broadens the scope of the model and enhances its future value. The data are stored in 
English units and continue to be used mainly in this format. These changes were brought 
about by suggestions of estimators after the first release of KYEstimate. 
The databases used for the model were enlarged and transferred into the database program 
DBASE IV. Microsoft QUERY was used to pull the data from DBASE IV into KYEstimate 
for use. This modification protects the data from being changed during the running of the cost 
estimate model and allows for easy addition of new projects to the database. The primary 
identifier for the data was changed from the TD-1 0 number to the Item number. These 
changes were made to make the data easier for estimators to find and use. 
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SUMMARY OF FOURTH AND FIFTH YEAR'S EFFORTS 
This section provides a summary of the fourth and fifth year's effort. The fourth year's effort 
was reported in interim report, KTC 97-15, June 1997. 
The oversight requirement resulted in 362 overruns worth over $162 million being presented 
to the IJCT from the time the law became effective (7/1/92) until the fourth interim report. By 
the time of cancelation of the IJCT review requirement, 562 overruns > 15% for a total cost of 
approximately $265 million were presented by the KyTC. All of these overruns were 
approved for additional funding. 
The databases used for the model were enlarged using recent preconstruction and construction 
cost data. Some changes were made to KYEstimate to allow it to run on updated versions of 
Microsoft Excel. 
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ESTIMATES DURING THE PERIOD OF STUDY 
Estimates developed usmg current methods have not proven to be significantly accurate to 
preclude cost overruns in excess of 15%. During the time the IJCT review requirement was in 
effect, 711/92-6/30/98, 562 overruns, totaling approximately $265 million were submitted to the 
IJCT for approval. All were approved for additional funding. 
The following analysis is based on information compiled from all past copies of the Notification 
to Legislature's Interim Joint Committee on Transportation Concerning Project Phase 
Cost Overruns > 15%. This document, an overrun report, is submitted by the KyTC to the 
IJCT for a phase overrun > 15% and is identified by a tracking number. A separate document is 
normally used for each phase request. A few documents were numbered and then withdrawn by 
the KyTC before consideration by the IJCT. Also, a few documents contained funding requests 
for two phases. The number of overruns used in the analysis, 562, differs slightly from the total 
tracking numbers. 
Figure 1 shows a breakdown of the number of overrun occurrences by phase. Figure 2 shows a 
breakdown of overrun costs by phase. These graphs illustrate the percentage of occurrences and 
costs for all overruns during the time the law was in effect. The construction phase produced the 
most occurrences (2/5) and costs (2/3) of all overruns, followed by the right-of-way phase with 
about Y. of the occurrences and 1/6 of the costs. Utility relocation phase contributed about 115 of 
the occurrences and 1/10 of the cost. The design phase accounted for the lease occurrences (1/7) 
and costs (1/20) of all overruns. 
Table 1 shows the cost and frequency breakdown, plus percentages of the totals, by phase, of the 
562 overruns. The bold number represent totals for the six years. Numbers in () are for the 1992 
biennium, [] for 1994, and {} for 1992. Tables 2-5 show specific overrun causes for each phase 
and the number of occurrences of each. Because overruns may have more than one cause listed, 
the total number of cause occurrences may be higher than the total number of overruns for a 
phase. Appendix 2 contains a list of tracking numbers which refers to the specific documents 
included in the count. 
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Construction 
40% 
20% 
Figure I - Overrun Occurrences by Phase 
Phase Number of 
Occurrences 
Design 91 
(41) [29] {21} 
Right-of-way 132 
(43) [46} {43} 
Utility Relocation 115 
(25)[36] {54) 
Construction 224 
(86) [74] {64} 
Totals= 562 
(195) (185] {182} 
% Occurring * 
16 
(21) (16] {12} 
24 
(22)[25] {24} 
20 
(13) [19] {30} 
40 
(44) (40] {35} 
100 
Construction 
67% 
Design 
Figure 2 - Overrun Costs by Phase 
Cost of Overruns %Cost** (in millions) 
$13 5 
(6) [5] {2} (6) (6] {2} 
$46 18 
(15) [14] {17} (15) [17] {21) 
$27 10 
(7) [9] {11} (7)[11] {13} 
$178 67 
(71) [55] {52} (71) [66] {64} 
$265 100 
(100) (83] {82} 
* percent of the 562 overruns that occurred in each phase 
**percent of the total cost of the 562 overruns ($265,000,000) attributable to each phase 
Table 1: Breakdown of Highway Cost Estimate Overruns by Phase. 
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Design Phase Overruns 
Overruns occurring in the design phase accounted for 16% of the total number and 5% of the 
total cost of all overruns: ninety (91) overruns@ $13 million. Table 2 contains a breakdown of 
causes of overruns for the design phase. Underestimation of the complexity of the project, 
underestimation because consultant fees were higher than the estimated in-house design costs, 
initial estimate based on preliminary data, and scope changes due to worse than expected site 
conditions were the main causes of design phase overruns. These causes accounted for nearly 
90% of all design phase overruns. Due to the low percentage of cost, 5%, the design phase is not 
considered a major factor of overruns. 
Cause/Justification Number of o/o Occurrence 
of Overrun Occurrences as Causes (%of All 
for Design Phase Design Phase 
Overruns Overruns) 
Underestimation of complexity of project 31 35 
necessitating further design effort over what 
was originally envisioned 
Underestimation because consultant fees 18 20 
were higher than the estimated in-house 
design costs 
Initial estimate based on preliminary plans, 14 15 
maps, and data 
Scope changes due to site conditions being 9 10 
worse than expected 
Scope changes due to local and public 8 9 
pressure & involvement 
Table 2: Major Causes of Design Phase Overruns. 
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Right-of-way Overruns 
Overruns in the right-of-way phase accounted for 24% of the total number and 18% of the total 
cost of all overruns: One hundred and thirty two (132) overruns @ $46 million. Table 3 shows 
the major causes of overruns for the right-of-way phase. Initial estimate made with very 
preliminary plans, maps, and generalized data; and changes in project scope as a result of 
decisions made in design were the two major causes of overruns. These two causes contributed 
to over half of the total overruns. Two other major causes are unusually high jury award and land 
values increased in vicinity of proposed right-of-way, causing 26.4% of the overruns. 
Cause/Justification Number of Occurrences as % Occurrence (% of All 
of Overrun Causes for ROW Phase ROW Phase Overruns) 
Overruns 
Initial estimate made with very 50 31 
preliminary plans, maps, and generalized 
data: estimate updated based on more 
design detail 
Changes in project scope as a result of 39 24 
decisions made in design 
Unusually high jury award 25 16 
Land values increased in vicinity of 18 11 
proposed right-of-way 
Changes in project scope aS a result of 9 6 
worse than expected site conditions 
Table 3: Breakdown of Right-of-way Phase Overruns 
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Utility Relocation Phase Overruns 
Overruns in the utility phase accounts for 20% of the total number and 10% of the total cost of all 
overruns: one-hundred and fifteen (115) overruns @ $27 million. Table 4 shows that the three 
most common causes were initial estimate made with very preliminary plans, maps, and 
generalized data, changes in scope from design changes, and increased relocation costs. These 
causes contributed about 90% of the total causes. 
Cause/ Justification Number of Occurrences as Causes for % Occurrence (% of 
of Overrun Utility relocation Phase Overruns All Utility relocation 
Phase Overruns). 
Initial estimate made with very 48 31 
preliminary plans, maps, and 
generalized data. Estimate 
updated based on more design 
detail 
Changes in project scope as a 39 25 
result of decisions made in design 
Increase in relocation costs over 27 17 
what was expected 
Inadvertent omission 15 10 
Changes in scope due to worse 13 8 
than expected site conditions 
Table 4: Breakdown of Utility Relocation Phase Overruns. 
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Construction Phase Overruns 
Overruns in the construction phase accounted for 40% of the total number and 67% of the total 
cost of all overruns: two hundred and twenty-four (224) overruns@ $178 million. The majority 
of overruns still occur in the construction phase. In addition, the construction phase still 
comprises the largest percentage of the total overrun cost, much greater than the three other 
phases. Table 5 shows that the major causes for construction overruns was higher than expected 
unit bid prices and/or individual work item costs. This one cause contributes one third (1/3) of 
the total causes for construction overruns. Two other major causes were changes in project scope 
as a result of decisions made in design and changes in scope due to worse than expected site 
conditions, contributing a combined 31% of the overruns. 
Cause/Justification Number of Occurrences as % Occurrence (% of 
of Overrun Causes for Construction All Construction 
Phase Overruns Phase Overruns). 
Higher than expected unit bid prices 136 38 
and/or individual work item costs 
Changes in project scope as a result of 58 16 
decisions made in design 
Changes in scope due to worse than 40 11 
expected site conditions 
Utility work done in construction 32 9 
phase 
Inadvertent omission 22 6 
Initial estimate made with very 25 7 
preliminary plans, maps, and 
generalized data: estimate updated 
based on more design detail 
Change in KyTC policy for 13 4 
contingency percent add-on 
Table 5: Breakdown of Construction Phase Overruns. 
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The following conclusions can be drawn from the data presented in Tables l-5. 
• While design phase overruns account for 16% of all overruns, they only account for 5% 
of the total cost reported. Design phase overruns are not a major problem. 
• Based on the 562 overruns >15%, the following would likely have occurred if estimates 
had been subject to the 15% overrun limitation only after the design phase was completed: 
• Approximately 50% of the right-of-way overrun causes would have been eliminated. 
• Approximately 50% of the utility relocation overrun causes would have been eliminated. 
• Approximately 25% of construction overrun causes would have been eliminated. 
• Changes in project scope as a result of worse than expected site conditions contributed 
10% of the causes listed for design phase overruns; 6% for right-of-way overruns, 8% for 
utility relocation overruns, and 11% for construction overruns. This cause provided fewer 
overruns in later bienniums, but increased site investigation by designers and estimators 
might reduce these overruns further. However, some soil conditions and contamination will 
always present a problem. 
• The construction phase accounted for 2/3 of the total cost of all overruns, but only 40% of 
the occurrences. Reducing the construction overruns will have a major impact on the cost to 
the state. Approximately 3 8% of overrun causes could be reduced if accurate unit bid price 
data was used. 
• Causes for overruns resulting from omissions in the estimates, transposing numbers, or 
switching of work between phases cannot be avoided unless estimates are updated 
periodically. 
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COST-PER-MILE MODEL 
The Cost-per-mile Model, KYEstimate, 1s a computer based program, written m 
Microsoft EXCEL 5.0, that: 
a) allows an estimator to access the preconstruction and construction databases through 
DBASE IV software and Microsoft Query, 
b) allows an estimator to select a set of past projects that are similar to the new project, 
c) processes the data related to the set of past projects producing a conceptual estimate 
based on historical data, 
d) allows an estimator to either accept the estimate based on historical data or to enter a 
new estimate, 
e) provides statistical information about the predicted accuracy of the new estimate 
based on past projects, and 
f) produces a Summary Sheet with the new estimate and important information about 
what the model predictions. 
The model, called KYEstimate, is very user-friendly. It went through several iterations 
during its development. A copy of the program, with a user's manual, was distributed to 
the 12 highway districts in January of 1996. After allowing the estimators a few weeks to 
experiment with the model, researchers went to each of the districts to answer questions 
and get feedback on the program. 
Reception to the program varied across the state. While some estimators seemed pleased 
to finally get some help with their conceptual estimates, others were not very receptive to 
using the program. The number one complaint of the estimators was the size of the 
database. Many districts only had 15 to 20 projects and therefore could not get a 
reasonable estimate. 
Estimators were also asked what parts of the program were most beneficial to them, or if 
there were unnecessary components within the program. Many suggested that the work 
type list was too defined, giving many maintenance projects that just would not be used. 
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Others suggested the program provide metric units and that an inflation factor be applied 
to the estimate. Each highway district was left with a copy of their district's projects and 
asked to make any corrections they felt were needed. Only five of the twelve districts 
returned any information on their data. 
After the visit with the districts, several changes were made to the model. Most were 
only cosmetic changes. Some of the data were moved around to make it easier for the 
estimators to find. Item number became the primary identifier rather than TD-1 0 number. 
Some classifications in the database were deleted because they were not valuable to the 
estimators. 
The databases are DBASE IV files, which facilitate updating the data. Upon opening the 
program, the database (either preconstruction or construction depending on what the user 
specifies) is pulled into the program using Microsoft QUERY. This protects the database 
from being changed within the program, but allows someone to update the DBASE IV 
file and send it to the districts. The updated copy of KYEstimate was released during 
February 1997. 
The size of the databases increased as more project phases were completed. With 
increases in projects the model becomes more valuable, using a much larger database to 
predict unit costs. Problems with incomplete data continue to limit the number of projects 
that can be included. Estimators may throw out projects with extremely high or low cost 
and still be left with a sufficient number of projects to use for their estimate. 
A metric option was added to the program. The database is in English units, but once in 
KYEstimate, it may be changed to metric. An inflation factor, default of 3%, is used on 
the estimates. Estimators can change the inflation factor if they believe the 3% is not 
accurate. Also, the inflation factor is now projected to the approximate time the project 
will be used, 2 years for preconstruction and 4 years for construction projects. 
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Projects in the database can be selected by nine key attributes: 
l District 6 Number of Lanes 
2 Construction Fiscal Year 7 Functional Class 
3 Construction Type 8 Length 
4 Route 9 Lane Width 
5 Work Type 
District- state highway district or districts; by number 1 - 12 
Construction Fiscal Year- year the construction phase took place 
Construction Type- types of work done in construction phase (see appendix) 
Route- road abbreviation and road number: US 60, KY 109, etc. 
Work Type- FHWA Order M5600.1A, 12/87 (see appendix) 
Number of lanes- number of lanes involved 
Functional classification- KyTC classification system (see appendix) 
Length - length in miles to three decimal points 
Lane Width - the width of the particular route 
EXAMPLE 
A new estimate is needed for the construction phases of a 2-lane rural resurfacing project 
in Clark County. The road length is three miles and includes shoulder improvements. 
All information relevant to the estimate is provided on the Estimate Summary Sheet 
screen shown in Figure 3 (page 21 ). 
After entering the information identifYing the project, etc. (Estimate Identification, Figure 
3), the estimator moves to the construction database and selects criteria to use in the 
search for completed projects similar to the new project. The criteria are set by selecting 
combinations of items under each of the headings in Table 3. These items may be 
combined by using logical queries. In the case of text, the queries may be AND, OR,=, 
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DIST 
CONST_FY 
CON_ TYPE 
ROUTE 
WORK_ TYPE 
#LNS1 
FCLASS1 
LENGTH 
LN_WDTH 
THIS ESTIMATE GENERATED BY KYESTIMATE 
PROJECT ID# 
ROAD NAME 
DISTRICT 
ESTIMATOR 
UNITS(ENGIMETRIC) 
DATE OF ESTIMATE 
DESIGN 
DESIGN 
DESIGN 
123456 
us 60 
7 
J.Walton 
ROW 
ROW 
MILES 
ROW 
ENG 
10/1/98 
UTILITY CONSTR 
58,839 
34,225 
141,192 
24,575 
13 
UTILITY CONSTR 
3.000 
3.0 
UTILITY CONSTR 
176,516 
198,670 
---KYEstimate 
TOTAL 
58,839 
34,225 
141,192 
24,575 
TOTAL 
TOTAL 
176,516 
$198,670 
I 
Project numbers 920437 and 940637 were deleted from the construction page to leave only 11 projects fitting the above 
criteria. Those specific projects had certain conditions that made them unuseful in estimating a project of this type. 
Figure 3- Estimate Summary Sheet 
KYEstimate developed at the University of Kentucky 
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etc. In the case of numbers, the queries may be =, >=, etc. A new system allows the user 
to type in his/her selection and click the "Filter" button. 
In this case, after trying various combinations, the estimator selects the following: 
~onstruction database, District 1, Construction Type_H, Work Type 72, ~ lanes, and 
Rural roads. The search of the construction database using these criteria finds the 
projects data shown in Table 6. 
Table 7 Search Results 
DISTRICT ITEM NO LENGTH LN WDTH TOTAL FY UNIT UNIT 
COST COST 
INFLATED 
7 920302 0.856 9 18146 1992 $21,199 $23,859 
7 920302 6.024 9 145489 1992 $24,152 $27,183 
7 940372 5.356 10 183082 1994 $34,183 $36,264 
7 910301 1.016 6 31906 1991 $31,404 $36,405 
7 910301 4.269 8 140776 1991 $32,976 $38,229 
7 920765 6.74 11 265621 1992 $39,410 $44,356 
7 940372 0.584 12 24789 1994 $42,447 $45,032 
7 930182 8.241 10 362919 1993 $44,038 $48,122 
7 930182 1.613 9 77096 1993 $47,797 $52,229 
7 930182 0.226 10 13867 1993 $61,358 $67,048 
7 940637 0.472 11 34622 1994 $73,352 $77,819 
7 920437 1.853 12 179451 1992 $96,843 $108,998 
7 940637 2.535 10 327550 1994 $129,211 $137,080 
The cost-per-mile of the selected past projects is calculated and presented on the screen 
(Statistical Analysis, Figure 3). 
The estimator can use the estimates for each phase determined by means of the actual 
costs of past projects in the selected set or enter a new estimate. If a new estimate is 
entered, statistical information about the probability of the estimate's accuracy based on 
past data is presented (User Estimate, Figure 3). The estimate to be used in the six-year 
plan is shown (6 YP Estimate, Figure 3). The estimator then records the criteria used for 
the set of projects used in the trial estimate (Search Criteria, Figure 3. ). Also, any 
justification for the new estimate being higher or lower than the historical data would 
predict is recorded (Estimate Justification, Figure 3). 
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The model, while simple in concept, is actually quite complex. 
An experienced estimator would likely make a better estimate than would KYEstimate. 
However, an experienced estimator is not always available, and it is sometimes difficult 
to justifY an estimate when actual costs are quite different. Using KYEstimate and 
making a new estimate in line with past experience is a conservative approach to 
conceptual estimating and provides justification based on past experience. 
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CONCLUSIONS 
The process of forecasting costs for highway work in Kentucky, in 1992, wasn't satisfactory 
to either the KyTC or the Legislature. The reporting requir~ments of the oversight law, 
KRS45.245, imposed additional work on the KyTC. Th~~1(s imposed, whereby reporting 
Votls requiied, were in some cases impossible to meet, and, in other cases, possible to meet 
only with additional staffing and/or by some staff members not performing normal duties. 
The oversight requirement (7 /92-7 /98) resulted in 562 overruns worth approximately $26~ 
million being presented to the Interim Joint Committee on Transportation for review. All of 
these overruns were been approved. The IJCT made no concerted effort to track cost 
underruns which demonstrate a poor estimate as much as an overrun. 
The overrun threshold, > 15%, was arbitrary and caused a lot of wasted effort by KyTC 
personnel. It would have been better to use different thresholds for different phases, or to 
allow updating estimates once the design phase is completed and a better scope of work is 
available. 
The conceptual estimating process can be improved by using actual costs of past projects to 
develop estimates for new projects. To do this requires that critical data be kept on all 
projects. KYEstimate can process historical data to allow estimators to use only those 
projects with like characteristics when preparing a new estimate. 
Estimates for right-of-way costs have not seen improvement with use of actual costs of past 
projects. The cost per parcel model and database that was being developed showed a high 
variation in unit costs and was abandoned. 
Estimates are a product of experience and information. Estimating experience has been 
disappearing rapidly in the KyTC. It is vitally important to develop databases and make them 
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available to personnel throughout the state. These databases will not only improve estimating 
ability but will serve to help justify estimates that later turn out to be inaccurate. 
This study offered an opportunity to make improvements to the KyTC's cost forecasting 
ability and to the relationship between the KyTC and the Legislature. A tool was developed 
that should improve the KyTC's conceptual estimating ability as well as provide justification 
for estimates that vary widely from actual costs. 
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RECOMMENDATIONS 
The following recommendations are made, based on the findings of this five-year study. 
• Look for innovative ways to improve both estimates and relations with the Legislature. 
• Educate legislators in the art/science of estimating and the limitations of what can be 
done with current resources. 
• Develop and maintain statewide and regional databases of highway costs. 
• Assign more resources to estimating, with a method to account for their utilization. 
• Set up a budget from either new or reallocated funds for the estimating effort, so that a 
cause and effect relationship can be established. 
• Develop a standard estimating procedure and train all estimating personnel on its use. 
• Establish a formal review policy and schedule for all estimates. 
• Require an estimator's name, date and estimate class for all estimates appearing on the 
Project Authorization Form (TC-1 0). 
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APPENDIX I 
I. Planning phase, project planning studied 
2. Design phase, design projects 
3. Right-of-way phase, right-of-way projects 
4. Construction phase 
a. Grade, drain, and surfacing 
b. Grade and drain 
c. Surfacing on new route or reconstruction 
d. Bridge construction 
e. Roadside improvement 
f. Traffic Services 
g. Service facilities 
h. Resurfacing 
Functional Class Codes 
1. Rural Principal Arterial - Interstate 
2. Rural Principal Arterial- Other 
6. Rural Minor Arterial- Other 
7. Rural Major Collector 
8. Rural Minor Collector 
9. Rural Local Road 
11. Urban Principal Arterial- Interstate 
12. Urban Principal Arterial- Freeway/Expressway 
14. Urban Other Principal Arterial 
16. Urban Minor Arterial 
17. Urban Collector 
19. Urban Local Street 
p 
D 
R/W 
u 
c 
G 
s 
B 
I 
T 
F 
H 
RPAI 
RPAO 
RMNA 
RMJC 
RMIC 
RLR 
UPAI 
UPAFE 
UOPA 
UMNA 
uc 
ULS 
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Work Type Classification 
Code Explanation 
010 New Route 
020 Relocation 
031 Reconstruction to Freeway 
032 Reconstruction with More Lanes 
033 Reconstruction to Wider Lanes 
034 Pavement Reconstruction with Alignment Improvements 
035 Pavement Reconstruction 
040 Major Widening 
050 Minor Widening 
060 Restoration and Rehabilitation 
071 Resurfacing with Shoulder Improvements and Portland Cement Concrete 
Pavement Restoration 
072 Resurfacing with Shoulder Improvements and Bituminous Pavement 
Restoration 
077 Resurfacing with Portland Cement Concrete Pavement Restoration 
078 Resurfacing with Bituminous Pavement Restoration 
080 Bridge Replacement 
081 Bridges Rehabilitation 
082 Minor Bridge Rehabilitation 
090 Safety 
091 Traffic Control Systems 
092 Environmental Enhancement 
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APPENDIXII 
Major Causes o f D . 0 es1gn Phase verruns 
Cause/Justification # Occurrences Contributing Track Numbers 
of Overrun as Causes 
Underestimation of complexity of project 31 6,26,50,88,90,94,95,99, 139, 140,141,158, 175,176,183 [12, 14, 
necessitating further design effort over what was 53,54,55,59,65, 71, 79, 121,146, 152] ( 5,88, 89,143} 
originally envisioned 
Underestimation because consultant fees were higher 18 5,42,43,50,76,77,96, 97,106,109 [71,77,79] (98,99,106,128, 
than the estimated in-house design costs 139,140} 
Initial estimate based on preliminary plans, maps, and 14 7,8,9,60,61,62,63, 107,161 [49, 159, 163,169] (25,37} 
data 
Scope changes due to site conditions being worse than 9 3 [48, 164,169,172, 173] ( 53,96,1 09} 
expected 
Scope changes due to local and public pressure & 8 [25,42,43] 
involvement 
Major Causes of Right-of-way Phase Overruns 
Cause/Justification # Occurrences Contributing Track Numbers 
ofOvenun as Causes 
Initial estimate made with very preliminary plans, 50 6,26,50,88,90,94,95, 113,136,138,154, 156,160,165 [8,26,41, 
maps, and generalized data: estimate updated based 50,56,57,58,61 ,89,91,92,93,94,96, 103,118,135, 138] (3,6,7,9, 
on more design detail 10, 16,40,59,69,71, 102,105,117,124,139,152,154, 159} 
Changes in project scope as a result of decisions 39 73,87,89, 118,155,167,168 [1 0, 11, 16,21,23,39,51,52,58,62, 
made in design 89,116] (3,24,51,55, 62,63,70,71,76,83,86,95,108, 117,118, 
127,139,140,141, 158} 
Unusually high jury award 25 1 ,2,3,25,48,53,71,83, 114, 157,166,192,193 [58,88,90, 102, 
116,118,139,153,154, 160,161] (58} 
Land values increased in vicinity of proposed right~ 18 14,59,69, 74, 75,84,86,87,89 [ 1 0,56,85, 93, 112,138, 144] 1 16, 
of-way 158} 
Changes in project scope as a result of worse than 9 59 [38,57,61 ,93, 132] (38,59, 136} 
expected site conditions 
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Major Causes of Construction Phase Overruns 
Cause/ Justification # Occurrences Contributing Track Numbers 
of Overrun as Causes 
Higher than expected unit bid prices and/or individual 136 l2, l6, l7, l8, l9,20,2l ,22,23,24,29,30,3l ,36,39,45,46,47,54, 
work item costs 66,78, 79,80,8l ,82,85,93, l 04, !05, !19, 120, l2l, 122, l26, l27, 
l28, l29, l30, l3l, !33, 134,135, !43, 147,148, l50, lS!, !52, 163. 
164, l78,!79, 180, 181' 182, !84, 185, !89, 194, l95, 196 [3,4, 
7, !9,20,28,29,30,33,35,36,3 7,44,46,47, 60, 66,67,68,75,76, 
8!,82,86,98,99, l 00, l 05, l 06, !07, l 08, l 09, 1!3, 114, liS, 120, 
124,125, !26, 127, 129,130, 13!, 142,148, !49, !51' !56, !57, 165, 
166, 167] { 12, 15, !9,20,21 ,26,28,34,35,42,43,44,46,47,54,56, 
57,66, 79,142,14 7, !51, !57} 
Changes in project scope as a result of decisions made 58 16,21 ,29,3 7,38,45,57,58,82, 102,145,146, !53, 162 [5, 7, 15,33, 
in design 45,66,69,1 00,1!3, !30, 141,143, 170,!7!] { 13,18, 21,26,30,31' 
34,35,41,46,54,56,6!,66,74,79,80, l 01, l 07, !10, Ill, 112,125, 
126,!47,148, 149, !50, 151,155) 
Changes in scope due to worse than expected site 40 1!,30,39,56,187,188 [20,27,46,47,70,75, 82,114,124,!48,!49, 
conditions ISO, !51, !56] { 14, 17,27,32,33,65,73,74, 78, 82,84,85,92,94, 
97,112, !!3, 142, !51, !56} 
Utility work done in construction phase 32 12, 17,21,24,30,3! ,57,58,85!26, 144,149, lS! ,152, !53, !64 
[3,5, 7,34,60,66, 76,81, 113, !56, !68] {45, 1!6,126, !50, !57) 
Inadvertent omission 22 18,21,55, l 00 [19,45,69, l 00, l 05, l 06,131' 137,150,!51' !56, 
168] { 19,42,43,85,93, 101} 
Initial estimate made with very preliminary plans, 25 19,23,35,36,56,!23,!23,!25,132,186 [46, 47,80,81,109,1!4, 
maps, and generalized data: estimate updated based 127,128, 129,142,143,167] {15,29,57,81} 
on more design detail 
Change in KyTC policy for contingency percent add- 13 [30,35,36,45,46,47,67,68,86, 148,149, !50, !51] 
on 
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